Abstract-Language-based information-flow security is concerned with specifying and enforcing security policies for information flow via language constructs. Although much progress has been made on understanding information flow in object-oriented programs, little attention has been given to the impact of class initialization on information flow. This paper turns the spotlight on security implications of class initialization. We reveal the subtleties of information propagation when classes are initialized, and demonstrate how these flows can be exploited to leak information through error recovery. Our main contribution is a type-and-effect system which tracks these information flows. The type system is parameterized by an arbitrary lattice of security levels. Flows through the class hierarchy and dependencies in field initializers are tracked by typing class initializers wherever they could be executed. The contexts in which each class can be initialized are tracked to prevent insecure flows of out-of-scope contextual information through class initialization statuses and error recovery. We show that the type system enforces termination-insensitive noninterference.
INTRODUCTION
L ANGUAGE-BASED concepts and techniques are becoming increasingly popular in the context of security [23] , [37] , [41] , [36] , [25] , [27] , [14] , [18] because they provide an appropriate level of abstraction for specifying and enforcing application and language-sensitive security policies. Popular examples include: 1) Java stack inspection [41] , which enforces a stack-based access-control discipline, 2) Java bytecode verification [25] , which traverses bytecode to verify type safety, and 3) web languages such as Caja [27] , ADsafe [14] , and FBJS [18] , which use program transformation and language subsets to enforce sandboxing and separation properties.
Language-based information-flow security [36] is concerned with specifying and enforcing security policies for information flow via language constructs. There has been much recent progress on understanding information flow in languages of increasing complexity [36] , and, consequently, information-flow security tools for languages such as Java, ML, and Ada have emerged [29] , [35] , [39] . In particular, information flow in object-oriented languages has been an area of intensive development [28] , [13] , [6] , [2] , [7] , [9] , [1] , [30] , [12] , [22] . However, it is surprising that the impact of class initialization, being an important aspect of objectoriented programs, has received scarce attention in the context of security. In a language like Java, class initialization is lazy: classes are loaded as they are first used. This introduces challenges for information-flow tracking, in particular when class initialization may trigger initialization of other classes, which, for example, may include superclasses. Additional complexity is introduced by exceptions raised during initialization, as these can be exploited to leak secret information.
Because of its power, Java's class loading mechanism [24] is a target for our model. A class is loaded, linked, and initialized lazily on demand upon first active use [26] . 1 Moreover, the programmer may define application-specific loading policies. Class loading constitutes one of the most compelling features of the Java platform.
This paper turns the spotlight on security implications of class initialization (and loading and linking-prerequisites for initialization). We discuss the subtleties of information propagation when classes are initialized. The key issue is that class initialization may perform side effects (such as opening a file or updating the memory). The side effects may be exploited by the attacker who may deduce from these side effects which classes have (not) been initialized, which is sometimes sufficient to learn secret information.
We propose a formalization that illustrates how to track information flow in presence of class initialization by a type-and-effect system for a simple language. By ensuring that the initialization (or success thereof) of a class containing public fields in no way depends on the evaluation of an expression (or success thereof) containing secret data, the type-and-effect system guarantees security in a form of noninterference [20] . Informally, noninterference guarantees that a program's public outputs are independent of secret inputs. A key intricacy here is that of class dependencies: An initialization of one class can cause the initialization of other classes. The only approach we are aware of that actually considers class initialization in the context of information-flow security is Jif [28] , [29] . 1 . The JVM specification permits the large flexibility as to the timing of loading and linking. But these activities must appear as if they happen on the class's (or interface's) first active use.
However, Jif's restrictions on initialization code are rather severe: only simple constant manipulations, which cannot raise exceptions, are allowed. Our treatment of class initialization is more liberal than Jif's and yet we demonstrate that it is secure. We argue that this liberty is desirable in scenarios such as server-side code.
BACKGROUND
This section presents informal considerations that lead to a formalization in following sections. For illustration purposes, we use a simple subset of Java with classes that contain static fields. We assume variables and fields are partitioned into high (secret) and low (public), depending on the confidentiality of values they store. We assume that l and h are low and high variables, respectively. The goal is to prevent programs from leaking initial values of secret variables and fields, into final values of public variables and fields. The context corresponds to a body of a conditional or loop. This context is high if the guard depends on a secret (i.e., contains a secret variable or field) and low otherwise. Consider the following class definitions, with D:x and C:y low:
Certainly, the above definitions may be considered secure since no high data are involved. However, an attempt to instantiate an object of D may cause an information leak:
Except when h has the value 0 initially, the above program results in an error, since an initialization of class D is attempted. The object creation, should it occur, is the first active use of D. This triggers initialization of D. When a class is initialized, all its field-(field-)initializer assignments are executed in the state in which the first active use of the class occurred. Here, D:x :¼ 1=C:y is performed in a state where C:y ¼ 0, so a division by 0 occurs, producing an error. Note that in the terminology we have introduced, the initialization occurs in a high context. The attacker learns about the secret value of h by observing the termination behavior. It is illustrative to compare the above program that leaks through termination behavior with the following one that does not:
In this latter program, D is initialized before it is used in a high context, so running the second new D statement does not incur any initialization activities.
In Java, when initialization of a class has completed abnormally, an exception is thrown and the class is marked as erroneous. Initialization of a class in an erroneous state is not possible [26, Chapter 2] . 2 This makes initialization failure persistent throughout a run in the sense that when initialization of a class failed on it first (active) use, then it will fail on any future use irrespective of the state in which the second initialization is attempted. 3 Catching initialization errors introduces a delicate scenario of information leaks. For instance, consider the following program: Again, the above program results in an error except when h has the value 0 initially. In effect, information from h flows out of the scope of the if, through the initialization status of D, into the termination behavior of the last statement. The next variation of the example shows how to exploit this flow so that the resulting program always terminates normally and reflects the initial value of h in the final value of l. Standard security type systems (e.g., [28] , [32] , [21] , [5] ) allow liberate handling of exceptions raised by expressions that are independent of secret data, as long as these expressions are used in public context. Since seemingly neither class definitions of C nor D involves high variables, one may be tempted to consider possible errors caused by initializing D as low. However, Program p main , given below, illustrates the subtlety of the problem: The above program successfully terminates irrespective of the initial value at h, and the final value at l indicates whether h was nonzero or not.
Leaks like these can easily occur in practise; consider the Java program in Fig. 1 . Here, class D, originating from [8] , implements the Singleton design pattern through the "initialization on demand holder" idiom, which is thread safe (as opposed to using double-checked locking [34] ). To achieve thread safety, this implementation leaves it to the class loader to construct the instance of D by calling the constructor in a field initializer. Since the class initialization phase is guaranteed to be serial [19, Section 12.4] , no race conditions occur, so only one instance of D is ever created. However, the class dependencies in this program are exactly the same as those in p main , so in exactly the same way that one bit of the initial value of h is reflected in l after execution of p main , one bit of the high input is reflected in the low output of the program in Fig. 1 .
Dependencies in class definitions can impact security: before a class C is initialized, for each field and initializer C:x :¼ e in C, for each D:y occurring in e, D is initialized. We say C depends on all these classes. If, when initializing C, initialization of any class D which C depends on fails, then initialization of C fails. For instance, consider the class definitions below, involving only low fields: The bottom line is that class initialization may perform side effects, causing information to leak. Languages which lazily initialize static classes, and where initialization failure is persistent, have this information channel. This includes Java (as seen above) and C# (example in the associated technical report [33] ), but excludes C++ (no nonconstant field initializers), VB.NET (no static class fields), Smalltalk (no field initializers), Ruby and Python (classes are objects, and failure is not persistent). One rather conservative approach to securing class initialization is to eliminate any possibilities of side effects during initialization and disallow errors due to initialization to be caught, an approach taken in Jif [28] , [29] . This approach rules out, among other, read and write access to instance as well as static fields, method calls, and object creation during initialization. For example, a static field of a reference type may only be initialized to null, which would exclude some standard Java APIs [38], such as (java.lang.)Boolean and String, etc. Indeed Jif restricts (class) field initializers to simple constant manipulation that may not raise any exceptions. This makes the particular implementation of the Singleton pattern given in Fig. 1 impossible in Jif. While it is rarely good practice to catch errors within ordinary methods, such as methods in libraries, there are several scenarios where this is good practice, e.g., in server applications to avoid crashing the entire system due to third-party applications or to log messages. An example from practice where errors are caught and rethrown as exceptions can be found in [17] .
This paper proposes and formalizes a different approach: we allow side effects during initialization, as long as these do not cause insecure flows. This paper extends and improves an earlier conference version [31] . The enforcement mechanism in the conference version disallows class initializations in secret contexts altogether, does not consider class dependencies, and uses a fixed lattice of security levels. These limitations are resolved in the present version: we present a more permissive type-and-effect system which is furthermore parameterized by an arbitrary lattice of security levels. We track flows through dependencies in the class hierarchy and in field initializers, and track every context in which each class can be initialized in, to prevent the kind of leak demonstrated in program p main . Finally, we prove that our type system soundly enforces a termination-insensitive notion of noninterference (TINI).
Section 5 develops a type-and-effect system for tracking information flows in a simple language with classes, defined in Section 3 (class hierarchies added in Section 6). We show in Section 7 that the type-and-effect system enforces TINI, given in Section 4. Sections 8 discusses related work, and Section 9 concludes.
LANGUAGE
We define the language for our formal study by the following abstract syntax:
Expression e ::¼ n j x j e È e j C:x Statement s ::¼ skip j s; s j x :¼ e j C:x :¼ e j if e then s else s j try s catch s j while e do s Class definition c ::
Metavariables x, n, È, and C range over variables, integers, operators, and class names, respectively. Notation C:x denotes field x of class C. Compound expressions are built using binary (integer arithmetic) operators, ranged by metavariable È. We assume a collection of such operators, partitioned into partial and total operators, ranged by È P and È T , respectively. Total, resp. partial, operators are represented as functions mapping into Z Z, resp. Z Z [ fg, if both operands are integers, and into fg if either operand is . The case n 1 È P n 2 ¼ represents the scenario where È P is undefined on ðn 1 ; n 2 Þ. So, here, denotes an evaluation error as a result of an undefined partial operator application. The notation ðx ¼ eÞ Ã denotes a possibly empty sequence of x ¼ e. The notation c Ã is similar. Our class definition notation is a compacted version of the one seen in the previous section; C f x 0 ¼ e 0 . . . x k ¼ e k g declares a class named C consisting of the fields x i and field initializers e i . Instead of modeling arbitrary statement execution during class initialization, we include only the minimum constructs required for flows through class initialization statuses to occur. We assume i 6 ¼ j ¼) x i 6 x j in the following. When C extends C 0 (C a subclass of C 0 , C inherits from C 0 ), we instead write
is the subtype relation). We sometimes write x 0 ¼ e 0 . . . A program is a pair ð; sÞ of a class table and a statement. We let p range over programs. To lighten notation in our formal study, we assume a fixed hereafter.
The following syntactic categories, not part of the language syntax, arise during program execution:
Programs operate on a state (a.k.a. store, or memory). A state, ranged over by , maps variables and fields to integers, and class names to (class) initialization statuses. A class initialization status S denotes the loaded status of a class named C in a state : C is uninitialized in when ðCÞ ¼ U; C is being initialized when ðCÞ ¼ B, and is initialized successfully when ðCÞ ¼ I. C has failed to initialize when ðCÞ ¼ . We use the following notation for updating the value of x in , and analogous notation for a C:x 7 ! n and a C 7 ! S update:
We use as a wildcard, that is, any mathematical object, which we do not intend to refer to. 4 The (big-step) operational semantics of our language is given by relations of the form h; i ) h 0 ; i. Here, is the state before evaluation, the former is that which is evaluated under , the latter is the result of the evaluation, and 0 is the resulting state. Evaluation of expressions is given in Fig. 2a . The relation h; ei ) h 0 ; V i states that the expression e in the state evaluates to the value V with final state 0 . If V ¼ , an error occurred during the evaluation of e under . Otherwise, e evaluated successfully, in which case V ¼ n for some n. The inference rules in Fig. 2a are straightforward except those for reading from a field of a class, C:x. Both read and write access to a field of a class C triggers initialization of C. That is, the definition of C, ðCÞ, is evaluated under using the rules in Fig. 2b , using relation h; ci ) h 0 ; Ii with c ¼ ðCÞ ¼ Cfig, which states that class definition c in state evaluates to initialization result I with final state 0 . If ðCÞ 6 ¼ U, then initialization of C has already been triggered, and possibly failed, so I ¼ ðCÞ and 0 ¼ . If ðCÞ ¼ U, then C needs to be initialized. This is done by executing the field definitions of C as assignments. We refer to this code as the (class) initializer of C. Given field definitions i of C, we define the initializer of C, sðC; iÞ, as follows:
So, to initialize C, we execute sðC; iÞ under with initialization status of C set to B, using relation h; si ) h 0 ; T i with s ¼ sðC; iÞ, which states that statement s in state evaluates to termination result T with final state 0 . If T ¼ , then an error occurred during the execution. Otherwise, T ¼ skip, signifying that the execution was error free. Once execution of i has terminated with termination result T , we set the initialization status of C in the resulting memory to IðT Þ, where
4. Multiple occurrences of in the same context can represent different mathematical objects. If I ¼ , then this means C failed to initialize (now or previously), so its field read will fail. Otherwise, the resulting value is the value C:x has in the resulting memory. Note that for readability, we have postponed all treatment of class hierarchies to Section 6.
Execution of statements is given in Fig. 3 . We let " 0 denote a non-0, non-value. Again, the inference rules for the bigstep reduction relation are straightforward, with the exception of the expression evaluation error rule ðE-E ) Þ and the class field assignment rules ðFIELD-A-E ) Þ and ðFIELD-A-OK ) Þ. For the former, Q½e specifies a grammar with a "hole" in it. That is, e is a formal parameter, and, for instance, Q½4 þ 5 Ã x defines a grammar where e has been replaced by 4 þ 5 Ã x (while 4 þ 5 Ã x do skip is generated by said grammar). For the latter, note that an assignment to C:x triggers initialization of C. To initialize C in rules ðFIELD-A-E ) Þ and ðFIELD-A-OK ) Þ, we simply read C:x, since doing this causes C to be initialized as a side effect.
SECURITY
We now develop a security notion for our language, and give examples of programs that leak through class initialization statuses.
Lattices
We recap some basic definitions from order theory. A partially ordered set (poset) is a set A together with a binary relation v over A which is reflexive, antisymmetric, and
If a lub of x and y exists, it is (provably) unique, so we denote it x t y, thus defining a join operator t. When x t y is defined 8x; y, then poset A is a join-semilattice. For x; y; z 2 A, z is a meet (greatest lower bound, glb) of x and y if z v x, z v y and 8w 2 A : w v x^w v y ¼) w v z. If a glb of x and y exists, it is (provably) unique, so we denote it x u y, thus defining a meet operator u. When x u y is defined 8x; y, then poset A is a meet-semi-lattice. A poset is a lattice iff it is a join-and a meet-semi-lattice.
Noninterference
We assume an arbitrary lattice L of security levels [16] . In our examples, we use a two-level lattice; low (public) and high (secret), with low v high. We let metavariables ' and pc range over security levels. We assume that each variable and class field has been assigned a fixed security level, and denote this mapping from variables and class fields to security levels by lvl. We extend this mapping to expressions by letting lvlðeÞ denote the least upper bound of the security levels of all variables and class fields occurring in lvlðeÞ. For notational simplicity, we assume a fixed lvl henceforth.
These security levels define who can observe what. An observer in our setting is assigned a security level expressing which variables and class fields we assume the observer has access to. If an observer has level ', then the observer can read variables and class fields with level v ', and write to these before the program is run. This gives rise to an (observational) equivalence on memories. 
It turns out ¼ ' is an equivalence relation, which will turn out to be useful later.
We adopt a commonly used baseline policy of termination-insensitive noninterference [32] , [36] , [40] . Intuitively, a program satisfies noninterference if for any two initial memories that agree on public data, whenever the program runs that start in these memories terminate, then these runs result in the memories that also agree on public data. This policy is an appropriate fit for batchjob programs, where leaks due to (non)termination are ignored because they may leak at most one bit per execution [4] . An initial memory init in our setting satisfies init ðCÞ ¼ U for all C, and init ðC:xÞ ¼ 0 for all C:x. In this sense, the "input" to a program is a value assignment to global variables. 
Definition 4.2 (TINI

Running Examples
We now present challenges an enforcement mechanism of TINI must deal with, in form of example programs, some of which are insecure, others which are secure. While the programs are simple, their pattern can easily arise in larger programs, so a decent enforcement mechanism must reject the insecure programs, yet accept the secure programs, presented here. Our first program, p main , is the main example from Section 2. Even with all fields in the class table labeled high, this program leaks an out-of-scope secret context by (ab)use of the try-catch language construct. One way to reject this program in an enforcement would be to "taint" C by the security level of all contexts which dereferencing of C occurs in. This approach would also reject p art , obtained by replacing the definition of D with the following:
This program is secure. However, for some memories, try new C catch l :¼ 1 becomes insecure. Namely, the memories that state that C failed to initialize. However, these memories never arise when running p art on an initial memory (C cannot fail to initialize), meaning we cannot universally and unconditionally quantify memories when proving soundness of the enforcement mechanism, as artificial flows can then arise. The next program, p LinH , leaks since the point during control flow at which a class C with an observable field is initialized, depends on a secret, and observable parts of the memory change between these points
Class table of p LinH :
This program can be secured by injecting new C; just before the first if statement in p LinH . We refer to this modified p LinH as p 0 LinH . The lesson here is that it is okay for a reference to a class C, containing a low field, to appear in a high context, as long as dereferencing C there cannot cause C to be initialized.
ENFORCEMENT
We now present a type system for enforcing noninterference. The type system formalizes a data-flow analysis for tracking information dependencies in a program. To guarantee secure class initialization, in addition to standard information flow tracking in imperative systems [15] , [40] , [36] , we need to track two things during evaluations: 1) which classes are initialized, and 2) what information is leaked when such an action does (not) produce an error. To track 1, our enforcement performs a must analysis to soundly approximate at any program point which class must be (in the process of being) initialized. To track 2, our enforcement maintains a security level for each class expressing information obtained by observing whether its initialization produced an error or not (? for classes which cannot fail to initialize). The type system is syntax-directed, in the sense that the type rules specify how to compute the constituents of a type judgment. A type inference algorithm can thus easily be obtained from our type system.
As is standard [15] , [40] , the type system (over)approximates information flows during operator applications and at join points, that is, at "if," "try," and "while" constructs. The result of an operator application contains information from both operands, a partial operator application is considered able to fail, any branch in an "if" is considered possible, any number of iterations of "while" are considered possible, a try-branch of a "try" is considered able to fail at any point, and the execution of the catch branch is considered possible.
Type Environment
The above-mentioned tracking is maintained by the type environment À. Let L In denote the lattice given by U v B and B v I, illustrated in Fig. 4 . An initialization status as a type indicates the highest guarantee, in the order U, B, and I, of the initialization status of a class. Type U thus means "no guarantee." A type environment À consists of two mappings:
À s keeps track of the initialization status of classes. The second, À e , tracks information conveyed by observing whether a previous initialization of a class yielded an error. The notation for updating a À is given below (note the first case in À½C 7 ! e ' e ðĈÞ): The rationale for À s : We can only guarantee a class is initialized at the join point for all evaluations reaching said point if both À 1 and À 2 say the class is initialized. The rationale for À e : We assume the attacker knows exactly which control flow path was taken by the program, and thus exactly where classes fail to initialize. As demonstrated by p main , the knowledge of where during control flow a class fails to initialize can be the source of an information leak.
Type Rules
The type rules, for expressions and statements, respectively, are given in Figs. 5 and 6. The rules define a type judgement relation pc ' À ftg À 0 : ', where pc; ' 2 L. This type judgement reads:
"Under context pc, t maps type environment À to type environment À 0 and error level '."
We use the type judgement to gain insight into program behavior in the following way.
"Assume t is to be evaluated in a context containing information pc, with À expressing which classes are already initialized and information leaked through initialization error observations. Then, À 0 records (at most) the classes which were initialized during (successful) evaluation of t, and the new information that can leak through initialization error observations. Further, ' expresses the information leaked to observations of an evaluation error of t. This whole evaluation contains no insecure flows."
That last remark entails that we can use our enforcement to reason about the security of programs. The type rules contain several constraints engineered to make this so. We will explain the type rules now, and highlight a proof that our type judgment carries this meaning in Section 7.
We start with the rules for expression evaluation in Fig. 5a . Evaluation of n and x cannot fail and does not initialize classes, thus motivating ðNUM ' Þ and ðVAR ' Þ. However, this is not the case in ðFIELD ' Þ, as evaluating C:x can initialize C. We therefore type the definition of C, ðCÞ, using the rules in Fig. 5b , which we will describe momentarily. Now that we know how to type base expressions we move on to the type rules for compound expressions, ðOP-T ' Þ and ðOP-P ' Þ. As mentioned previously, there are two kinds of operators: total and partial. In both cases, when typing e 1 È e 2 , we first type e 1 , followed by e 2 . Notice that the context of the e 2 typing is augmented by ' 1 ; this is because in our semantics, e 2 is not evaluated at all if the evaluation of e 1 fails. Since either of these evaluations can fail, ' j are both reflected in '. For total operators, we are done. However, for partial operators, e 1 È e 2 can fail because e 1 È e 2 is undefined. An observer might know that e 1 È e 2 fails as a consequence of this (for instance, when this is the only way e 1 È e 2 can fail, as in 1=h). Thus, the information in any variable or field in e 1 and e 2 leaks to '.
We now move on to Fig. 5b . Recall from the semantics that when evaluating C:x, either initialization of C is triggered or not. If C is triggered, no evaluation occurs, and if C is not triggered, the initializer is evaluated. This behavior is reflected in ðINIT-T ' Þ and ðINIT-F ' Þ. Observe that the initializer can be typed multiple times, once for each different context in which initialization, and thus failure, is possible. The need for this was highlighted at the end of Section 5.1. When typing C fig, we first consult À s ðCÞ. If À s ðCÞ ¼ I, no flows occur since no evaluation can possibly occur here. However, if À s ðCÞ ¼ U, initializer i is typed using the initializer typing rule in Fig. 5c . The context of this typing is raised by À e ðCÞ, as this evaluation is only possible if C has not been initialized (and then possibly failed) previously. À is updated to À½C 7 ! s B since C is being initialized. As this initialization attempt can fail as a consequence of a previous initialization attempt failing, À 0 e ðCÞ is reflected in '. At last, the initialization status of C is set to I and the error level tracking of C is augmented by ' C , in À 0 . Notice that there is no rule for the case À s ðCÞ ¼ B. This means that our type system will reject any program which contains a mutual dependency in field initializers in the class table, such as classes C and D in the following class table: 
This also means that between À½C 7 ! s B and À 0 , the initialization status of C is not updated. So, À 0 s ðCÞ ¼ B, always. While rejecting programs with mutual dependencies rules out some well-behaving programs, it has been pointed out, e.g., in [42, Section 3.5.1] that 1) mutual dependencies should be considered a bug since they introduce hard-to-predict behavior, and 2) there are tools which can detect these. Because of this, the added challenge in proving soundness, and since mutual dependencies do not increase the bandwidth of leaks through class initialization statuses, we chose not to consider this feature in our security analysis. To add this feature to the typesystem, it should be sufficient to replace the premise of ðINIT-T ' Þ with À s ðCÞ 2 fB; Ig. We now move on to Fig. 5c . The one rule for initializer typing, ðINIT ' Þ, types each initializer expression in the same order as they would be evaluated in the semantics. Since the evaluation of an initializer expression depends on the success of all prior initializer expressions in this order, the context of the e i typing is raised by F iÀ1 j¼1 ' j . Likewise, a future read of any field in C will succeed only if none of the initializer expressions evaluated to error during initialization, so F n j¼1 ' j v lvlðC:x i Þ must hold. In the statement typing rules in Fig. 6 , we prevent explicit flows (l :¼ h) and implicit flows [15] via control structure (if h ¼ 0 then l :¼ 0 else l :¼ 1) in a standard fashion [15] , [40] , [36] . What is nonstandard here is how we construct type environments for joins in control flow branches. The control flows for the language constructs with join points (in successful evaluations) is illustrated in Fig. 7 . Compare (IF ' ) to Fig. 7a . Here, there are two successful control flow paths. The only classes we can guarantee are initialized at the join point are those that are initialized after taking either control flow path, hence the ðÀ 1 À 2 Þ s in the join point. Now, compare (TRY ' ) to Fig. 7b . There are two control flow paths here, one for successful evaluation of s 1 , the other for successful evaluation of s 2 after an erroneous evaluation of s 1 . The interesting case is the latter, as s 2 is typed under À À 1 . Since s 1 can yield an error without initializing a class, s 2 must be typed under À s . Since s 1 can fail anywhere, and the attacker could know exactly where s 1 fails, s 2 must be typed under À e 1 . It turns out that À s and À e 1 together are exactly À À 1 . Besides this, our treatment of exceptions is standard (see [28] , [32] , [21] , [5] ). Now, compare (WHILE ' ) to Fig. 7c . Here, there are (possibly) infinitely many control flow paths. In the type rule, n is the number of static iterations of the type system on e and s to produce successive type environments before a fixpoint is reached. Observe that loops are typed the same way as the infinitely long sequence e; s; e; s; . . . Since there are finitely many À (as has finite classes, and policy has finite labels), by Lemma 7.2, eventually the typing of this sequence reaches a fixed point. Since e might yield 0 on first evaluation, the only classes we can guarantee are initialized are those that are initialized during evaluation of e, so the s -part of the join environment should equal À 0 0 s . Since an attacker could know exactly which iteration of the loop failed, and whether e or s failed, the e -part of the join environment must equal 
HIERARCHIES
So far, we have seen a complete semantics and set of type rules for our language, excluding the C <: C 0 fig language construct. We saw in p dep from Section 2 that hierarchical dependencies can be utilized to leak information. We now present the semantics of hierarchical dependencies, and how to analyze programs which utilize these. We handle hierarchical dependencies in the same way as dependencies in field initializers. While the procedure of initializing C 0 as a consequence of initializing C is the same as the procedure for initializing C 0 as a consequence of reading a field of C 0 , we cannot emulate superclass initialization through field reads like we did in ðFIELD-A-E ) Þ and ðFIELD-A-OK ) Þ, since a class does not necessarily have any class fields. While some rules can be merged to yield a more concise set of rules, having a rule for each possible combination of class and superclass initialization statuses simplifies case analysis of programs, and thus our proofs. As such, while these rules may be technical, they should be unsurprising, given what we have seen so far.
Semantics
The semantic rules of class hierarchies are given in Fig. 8 . Just like for normal class initialization, if initialization of C has begun already, we do nothing, and simply return the initialization status of C in . Hence, ðINIT À S À A ) Þ. If C is uninitialized, however, then the first thing to do when initializing C is to initialize its superclass, C 0 , if needed. If initialization of C 0 has failed, then we cannot proceed initializing C, so initialization of C will fail. Hence, ðINIT-S-UF ) Þ. If initialization of C 0 has already begun (and has not failed), we skip the initialization of C 0 , so this case in rule ðINIT-S-UI ) Þ is just like the semantics of normal class initialization. If C 0 is uninitialized, we initialize it (setting the initialization status of C to being initialized, since we are currently initializing C). If this initialization of C 0 fails, then the initialization of C immediately fails (we don't even run i), hence ðINIT-S-UUF ) Þ. If initialization of C 0 succeeds, however, we run i. This evaluation yields either skip (for success) or (for failure). Regardless of which, we return, with initialization of C set to the initialization status corresponding to the return value from the i evaluation, I (for success) or (for failure). Hence, ðINIT À S À UUI ) Þ.
Type Rules
The rules for typing class definitions with hierarchical dependencies are given in Fig. 9 . Like for normal class initialization, when the type environment asserts that C is initialized, since the semantics would do nothing in this case, no flows occur here, so when pc ' À fcg À 0 : ', À 0 ¼ À and ' ¼ ?, hence ðINIT À S À T ' Þ. If C is uninitialized in À, we check the status of C 0 . If À asserts that C 0 is already initialized, then no flows arise from or through C 0 , so the ðINIT À S À FT ' Þ case is exactly like normal class initialization. The last rule, ðINIT À S À FF ' Þ, considers the case where both C and C 0 are uninitialized in À. Since this might also be the case in the program semantics, we assume the worst, that neither class is initialized. First, we type the C 0 class definition (under the assertion that C is being initialized). Since i would only be evaluated if C 0 initialized successfully, we raise the context under which we type i (evaluated after the C 0 definition) by ' C 0 . Likewise, because C can fail to initialize as a consequence of either the C 0 initialization failing or the i evaluation failing, À 00 e ðCÞ is augmented with ' C 0 t ' C .
SOUNDNESS
We now see how the different aspects of the type system fit together to form a whole which rejects leaking programs like p main and p LinH while at the same time staying permissive, accepting programs like p art and p are both secure. The insecurity arises when you put these in sequence. Typical type systems for information flow are (sequentially) compositional w.r.t. TINI, which makes proving soundness w.r.t. TINI a simple matter. As our type system does not have this property in general, our soundness proof is nonstandard. The key part of the soundness proof are the lemmas it makes use of, as these establish 1) which semantic and typing invariants are required for compositionality, and that 2) these invariants hold in initial states and typing environments. We motivate invariants with examples. Proofs of theoretical results presented in this paper can be found in the full version of this paper [33] . We present the lemmas for statements; the same results hold for expressions.
Monotonicity
The semantics and the type system both satisfy simple monotonicity properties w.r.t. their respective environments. Let L I be the (meet-semi-)lattice given by U v B, B v I, and B v , illustrated in Fig. 10 . This yields a (meetsemi-)lattice L ) of memories, where v 0 iff 8C : ðCÞ v 0 ðCÞ:
Notice that no rule for establishing h; i ) h 0 ; i, assigns C to an I in 0 such that ðCÞ 6 v I. This yields the following monotonicity property. We likewise obtain a lattice L ' of type environments by defining À v À 0 iff 8C : À s ðCÞ v À 0 s ðCÞ^À e ðCÞ v À 0 e ðCÞ: Fig. 8 . Big-step operational semantics for expression evaluation, class hierarchies. Fig. 9 . Typing of expressions, class hierarchies. Fig. 10 . L I .
Observe 
Must Analysis
Recall that part of the type system tracks, at any given point in the control flow of a program, which classes must be initialized. This analysis is crucial if we want to accept programs such as p 0 LinH , since, without it, the enforcement would not know anything about the status of classes possibly initialized in the past, meaning the enforcement would need to regard C as uninitialized when its reference is seen under h. For this analysis to be sound, the following property must be preserved.
Definition 7.1 (Agreement). agrees with À, written as À dep , iff, for all C,
Pt. 1 states what we expect; if the type environment states that a class is initialized, then that class is initialized in the corresponding memory. Pt. 2 states that a class is being initialized in a run if and only if the analysis tracks that said class is being initialized. 5 While this property may be straightforward, a straightforward proof that the property is preserved through typing and reduction fails. 
In line 2 of this program, for the type environment À at this point, À s ðCÞ ¼ U, since the must analysis can only guarantee that a class is initialized after a try-catch if said class is initialized in both the try and the catch branch (and the catch branch initializes nothing). However, in the memory at this point, ðCÞ ¼ I, since the try branch never fails. In the final type environment À 0 , À 0 s ðDÞ ¼ I, and a quick review of the semantics will show that in the final memory 0 , 0 ðDÞ ¼ I, so À 0 dep 0 . What is it, in the type system, and in the semantics, that makes this so?
The answer: Dependencies. Recall that initialization of a class C can fail if any of the classes C depends on fail to initialize, or have failed previously . Thus, if C is initialized successfully, then all the classes C depends on must also be successfully initialized, for the remainder of the run (last statement follows from Lemma 7.1). The set depðeÞ of classes e depends on is defined as follows:
the set of classes that must be initialized as a consequence of (successfully) evaluating e. Note that in the case of x ¼ e of class C, this assignment is always performed as a consequence of C being initialized. Hence, depðxÞ is not part of a union on the right-hand side of the definition of depðx ¼ e; iÞ. Since classes are only initialized when evaluating expressions, depðÁÞ is not defined on s. The type system preserves dep-consistency. Well-typed programs, run on a memory which agrees with the initial type environment, which terminate successfully, preserve dep-consistency and agreement.
Lemma 7.4 (Agreement preservation). For all À, À
0 , s, and 0 , if
Errors
The main facilitator of the information channel being considered in this paper is evaluation errors, as these can cause a class initialization to fail and thus be used to store information. Cases where errors come into play in our proofs are therefore of key importance. However, as we have seen in p art , this is not trivial; it is easy to construct memories which "lie," in the sense that they have registered that a class which can never fail, has failed to initialize. This creates artificial flows which our type system cannot guarantee the absence of. To address this issue, we formalize a sufficient condition for a memory to be "honest." Such memories are error consistent, that is, a class is only failed in the memory if, during runtime, that class could possibly fail. Since whether a class can fail or not depends on the same for the classes it depends on, this definition of error consistency is inductive in nature. Finally, our operational semantics preserves error consistency. This, together with the observation that initial 5 . About the () : Note that, since À overapproximates , there will be Às for which À s ðCÞ ¼ B for which there is no corresponding . But this is no problem, as we only need agreement to hold where such a exists. memories are error consistent, means we only need to consider error consistent memories in our proofs. Since our operational semantics preserves dep-consistency and agreement, we furthermore need only consider error consistent memories which are dependency consistent and agree with an appropriate type environment. Some term evaluations can still yield error under such memories; we call these terms volatile.
Definition 7.4 (Volatile). s is volatile under À, written
À err s, iff there exists a for which
Finally, we arrive at what we really needed: A welltyped volatile term leaks its context to its error level. Observe that in p art , the context did not leak, since the type system did not encounter a partial operator application. Intuitively, volatile expressions have a partial operator application somewhere along the path the type system takes to analyze s. If you examine ðOP-P ' Þ, you will see that this rule raises the error level by pc. Lemma 7.6 (Error leaks pc). For all À, s, pc, and ' 0 , if
Recall the leak in p main . There, old confidential contextual information, out of scope at the time the "low" assignment occurs, manages to leak into said assignment. When comparing two '-equivalent memories during parallel runs, we need a way to know, at the time of the low assignment, that the program, in a previous scope, branched on confidential information, thus causing different class initialization statuses (of classes with no observable fields). '-consistency gives us this. It turns out this relation is an equivalence relation, which will be useful in the next section. To link this relation with Lemma 7.6, intuitively, at the point where two runs start disagreeing on the initialization status of a class, the runs start entering a context containing confidential information. This context carries over to the class initialization. If that initialization can fail, then by Lemma 7.6, the error level of the initialization contains confidential information. At last, this error level is recorded in a type environment, and this recording carries over to the join point of the two runs.
Noninterference
We now have enough tools to tackle the type soundness result. If all runs on '-equivalent memories followed the same control-flow path in the program, proving soundness would be an easy matter. In reality, however, two '-equivalent runs can take different control-flow paths. It turns out that this only happens when an evaluation of '-unobservables is involved. For instance, for if e then s 1 else s 2 , if the evaluation of e depended only on observables, then e would evaluate to the same value in the two runs on '-equivalent memories, thus resulting in the same control-flow path taken. We would like the memories at the join point to be '-equivalent, but we cannot compare the intermediate memories of the two branching runs, as that reasoning will not be local. To address this issue, we ensure in our enforcement that no observable effects are allowed when the context contains confidential information. This way, if the memories at the branching point are '-equivalent (and '-consistent), the memories at the join point will be '-equivalent (and '-consistent) by transitivity.
Lemma 7.7. For all s, , 0 , À, À 0 , ', and pc, if
0 , and
At last, we get to the main lemma which uses the results we have seen so far. Given the usual assumptions, but for two '-equivalent, '-consistent memories, Lemma 7.8 states that the final memories are '-equivalent and '-consistent, and the success status of the evaluations differs only if confidential information is in ' 0 .
Lemma 7.8 (Main).
For all s, j , 0 j , À, À 0 , ', ' 0 , and T j , if
Take special note of parts 1, 5, and 6 in the premise, and parts 8 and 9 in the conclusion, of Lemma 7.8-these imply type soundness! We show how to "bootstrap" Lemma 7.8 to obtain a proof of soundness for our type system now. Let À init s ðCÞ ¼ U and À init e ðCÞ ¼ ? for each class in . 
RELATED WORK
A survey [36] on language-based information-flow security contains an overview of the area. Most related to ours is work on tracking information flow in object-oriented languages and on information-flow controls in the presence of exceptions.
Objects. To the best of our knowledge, the only information-flow mechanism that addresses class initialization is the one implemented by Jif [28] , [29] , a compiler for Java extended with security types. As discussed earlier, Jif is rather conservative about class initialization code. This code is restricted to simple constant manipulation that may not raise any exceptions. As mentioned earlier, sometimes it is desirable to lift these restrictions.
Much other work has been done on information-flow security for object-oriented languages. Although none of the approaches directly addresses problems with class initialization, we nevertheless discuss recent highlights.
Barthe and Serpette [13] present a type system for enforcing information-flow security in a simple objectoriented language based on the Abadi-Cardelli functional object calculi [3] . Bieber et al. [6] apply model checking for securing information flow in smartcard applets. Avvenuti et al. [2] suggest an information-flow analysis in a Java bytecode-like language. Bernardeschi et al. [7] check information-flow security in Java bytecode by combining program transformation and bytecode verification. These two approaches assume fixed security levels for classes. This might not be a flexible choice since it forces all instances and attributes to conform to the class level. Another concern is the scalability of this choice to inheritance.
Banerjee and Naumann [9] show how to guarantee noninterference by type-based analysis for a Java-like object-oriented language. Amtoft et al. [1] present a flowsensitive logic for reasoning about information flow in presence of pointers. Naumann [30] investigates invariantbased verification of information-flow properties in a language with heaps. Barthe and Rezk [11] consider typebased enforcement of secure information flow in Java bytecode-like languages. Barthe et al. [12] extend this to derive an information-flow certifying compiler for a Java-like language.
Hammer and Snelting [22] develop a flow-sensitive, context-sensitive, and object-sensitive framework for controlling information flow by program dependence graphs. This approach takes advantage of similarities of information flow and slicing analyses.
Exceptions. As noted earlier, our treatment of exception handling draws on standard approaches from the literature (which we extend with the must analysis). The intuition is if an occurrence of an exception in a statement may carry sensitive information, then there must be no publicly observable side effects in either the code that handles the exception or in the code between the statement and the exception-handling block. Jif [28] , [29] implements such a discipline. Based on a similar discipline, Pottier and Simonet [32] propose a sound treatment of exceptions for ML.
Barthe and Rezk [11] treat a single type of exceptions in a JVM-like language. Barthe et al. [10] extend this approach to multiple types of catchable exceptions. Connecting this with security-type preserving compilation, Barthe et al. [12] show how to securely compile a source language with a single type of catchable exceptions to the low-level language of [11] .
Hedin and Sands [21] prove a noninterference property for a type system that tracks information flow via class-cast and null-pointer exceptions. Askarov and Sabelfeld [5] show how to achieve permissive yet secure exception handling by providing the choice for each type of exception: either the traditional discipline discussed above or by consistently disallowing to catch exceptions. The actual choice for each kind of exception is given to the programmer.
CONCLUSION
Seeking to shed light on a largely unexplored area, we have presented considerations for and a formalization of secure class initialization. Our considerations highlight that class initialization poses challenges for security since controlling (the order of) side effects performed by class initialization is challenging. Hence, great care needs to be taken by information-flow enforcement mechanisms to guarantee security. One path, taken by Jif [28] , [29] , is to severely restrict class initialization code so that it may only manipulate constants in an exception-free manner. Arguing that it is sometimes too restrictive, we have explored another path: allow powerful initialization code but track its side effects. The enforcement ensures that the side effects do not reveal anything about the differences in control-flow paths that the program might take depending on secret input. Our formalization demonstrates the idea by a type-and-effect system for a simple language that enforces noninterference. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first formal approach to the problem of secure class initialization in the presence of class hierarchies. (Soundness of Jif's class initialization is yet to be established.)
Future work includes machine checking the invariantbased proofs, currently given by structural induction in the associated technical report [33] . We would also like to perform case studies to evaluate the precision of our enforcement mechanism. . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
